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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 70 SPRING 1996 NUMBER 2
ANTITRUST-THE NEXT ONE HUNDRED
YEARS
JOHN H. SHENEFIELD"
It is a very great honor for me to give the inaugural Lewis
Bernstein Memorial Lecture. I am deeply grateful to the Bern-
stein family, and particularly to Mrs. Elaine Bernstein, and also
to you, Dean Hasl, and Professor Cavanaugh and to the entire
Faculty of St. John's University School of Law.
Establishing a lectureship in memory of Lew Bernstein
was an inspired idea. The focus that such a lectureship gives to
substance, rather than ceremony or form, is very much in keep-
ing with Lew's own style-he was always the master craftsman
who held himself to a standard of excellence on the merits,
whether in public service or in private conduct. Lew loved the
law and valued its role in improving society. He was the quin-
tessential public servant, who saw clearly the role of government
as guarantor of political and economic liberties. Whenever any-
one speaks of the role of the government lawyer-or to put it in
more aspirational terms, the high calling of an advocate for the
public interest-my thoughts go immediately to Lew Bernstein.
And so, I take particular pleasure in delivering this lecture
dedicated to the memory of Lewis Bernstein in the hope that, in
thinking about the antitrust laws he so ably served, we all may
once again commit ourselves to the fundamental objectives of
those laws-competition and opportunity.
" A.B. (1960), L.L.B. (1965), Harvard University; former Assistant Attorney
General, in charge of the Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice;
partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius L.L.P.
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The title of this lecture-Antitrust-the Next One Hun-
dred Years-raises the question of the role of the antitrust laws
now and in the next century. To think about that question, we
must ask what were, and what are the purposes of those laws;
and how, if at all, are those purposes to change in the future.
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Discerning the objectives of the antitrust laws is, surpris-
ingly, no simple matter. The language of the statutes is broad
and general-constitutional, as some have described it. Accord-
ingly, it is not immediately obvious what is proscribed or what is
permitted, let alone why. The core concepts--"competition,"
"restraint of trade" or "monopolization"-are undefined. We
must look elsewhere for their inspiration and content.
The philosophical context helps. It features very promi-
nently an ungainly and absent-minded Scot who became in his
time one of the most celebrated and sought-after intellects of
Europe. Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations,1 regarded by
Thomas Jefferson as the best book then available on political
economy,2 described the rational economic man as minding his
own business and pursuing his own narrow economic interests,
but being led at the same time "by an invisible hand" through
the operation of the competitive market to promote the larger in-
terest of society.
3
In describing his ideal of the tradesman striving indirectly
to discharge the public interest, Adam Smith set his face against
powerful cultural forces. There was, first, the civic republican
tradition tracing back to the classical Greek suspicion of trade.'
Aristotle himself regarded the "trafficking in goods" as morally
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library 1937) (1776).
2 See I NATHAN SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFERSON A BIOGRAPHY 391 (1951).
3 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 423.
[E]very individual ... endeavors ... to employ his capital ... so to direct ...
that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily
labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He
generally ... neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how
much he is promoting it ... . [Hie intends only his own gain, and he is in
this ... led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention .... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of
the society ....
Id.
4 Id. at 647.
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hazardous for the individual and dangerous to political virtue.5
In the Politics,6 he wrote that "[i]n the city that is most finely
governed, the citizens should not live a vulgar or a merchant's
way of life, for this sort of way of life is ignoble and contrary to
virtue."7
No less disapproving was the second cultural barrier
Smith confronted: the suspicion toward commerce and profit
found in the Christian tradition, reflected in the Gospels' refer-
ences to the eye of a needle,' service of God and Mammon,'
treasures on earth,'0 and the love of money being the root of all
evils." When Jesus drove the merchants and moneychangers
from the Temple, Matthew reports that he used the term
"robbers."' The medieval Christian liturgy referred to Judas Is-
cariot as "that most vile of merchants."
In the face of these two powerful traditions, Adam Smith
conceived it to be the role of society to establish institutions pit-
ting the self-interested motives of citizens against each other for
the common good. 3 One such institution was the market. The
ambition for economic gain was not to be avoided; instead, it was
to be harnessed as the motive force that enabled an otherwise
primitive society to move from a collection of solitary individuals
of low estate struggling to achieve bare subsistence toward the
goal of "universal opulence.""
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but
to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities
but of their advantages. 5
5 See SIR ERNEST BARKER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 84 (1959)
(stating that Aristotle attacked trade as "a species of robbery").See generally ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS (Hippocrates G. Apostle & Lloyd P.
Gerson trans., 1986).
7id..
8 Matthew 19:24.
9 Matthew 6:24.
'0 Matthew 6:19.
11 1 Timothy 6:10.
12 Matthew 21:13.
13 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 423.
14 Id. at 11 ("[It] is the great multiplication of the productions ... in consequence of the di-
vision of labour, which occasions ... that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest
ranks of the people.").
1 Id. at 14.
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In one of the earliest references to the concept of a need for
law to protect the integrity of the market-what we have come to
call the antitrust law-Smith points out that an individual pro-
ducer will find it beneficial to avoid the risks of competition and
to circumvent the competitive market, in an effort to obtain the
highest possible price." After all, he observed in an oft-quoted
passage, "people of the same trade seldom meet together, even
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a con-
spiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices."'7
We sense in these early writings about the market and the
need to safeguard its efficacy a concern not only for the buyer of
goods or services-the consumer-but also for the competitive
process itself. That process is, after all, the critical means by
which society enables its citizens to exchange their labor or the
products of their labor for goods they desire, ultimately leading
to the creation of greater wealth. Keep the competitive process
effective, and the greater good is thereby served. Allow the proc-
ess to be degraded, or-much worse-manipulated, and the gen-
eral welfare suffers.
Adam Smith's philosophical allies in containing the power
of government were the great Enlightenment liberals and natu-
ral rights theorists, including John Locke and Montesquieu. The
free market economy based on enlightened self-interest presup-
posed the need for safeguards for private property, along with
personal liberty and the right of contract. These were ideals that
18th century revolutionaries and 19th century gentry and middle
class all could support. The great political documents of the 18th
century enshrined the concept that, just as civil liberties require
that the government's power over the individual be limited, pri-
vate enterprise and the market likewise require that government
be forced to respect private property. Undue centralization of
power, it was thought, is the enemy of political and economic
freedom alike. The organization of a liberal economic society is
necessarily linked to the dispersion of political power.
In English courtrooms the common law was evolving into
opposition to the royal grant of private monopolies. Sir Edward
Coke cited a line of authority allegedly reaching back to the
" See id. at 61 (describing monopolists holding back stock to sell at higher rates).
17 Id. at 128.
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Magna Carta,18 but the case decisions were in fact much more re-
cent. One of the best known is Darcy v. Allein19 which taught
that a royal grant would be invalid if it created a monopoly."
But the rationale of all of the judicial decisions was less a rea-
soned opposition on economic grounds to monopoly as a concept
of inferior economic organization, and was instead more an ob-
jection to the arbitrary political power reflected in their grant by
the King.
Thus, the Statute of Monopolies of 162421 was by no means
an effort by the Parliament to establish the virtues of competi-
tion; instead, Parliament was raising a constitutional objection
to the political power of the throne reflected in the arbitrary
grant of monopoly. Indeed, only private monopoly granted by the
King was abolished; traditional monopolies of cities and bor-
oughs, guilds and chartered trading companies retained their
privilege, although with gradually weakening force, until abol-
ished over a hundred years later.
Another consistent theme in the evolution of the common
law is a growing disapproval of contracts and combinations in
restraint of trade. As early as the 15th century, John Dyer's2"
case and the Schoolmaster" case both questioned whether an
agreement not to practice a trade was contrary to the common
law. In Mitchel v. Reynolds," an 18th century King's Bench
judge paired the two concepts by reciting that monopoly was
against the policy of the law26 and also that private restraints of
trade, when justified by special circumstances, could be reason-
able and therefore lawful.2
18 See Darcy v. Allein, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1262-65 (K.B. 1602) (citing extensive authority,
including Magna Carta, prohibiting monopolies).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1263-65 (holding grant to plaintiff was void because monopoly is against common
law and acts of Parliament).
21 An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations of Penal Laws and the Forfeitures
Thereof, 1624, 21 Jam., ch. 3 (Eng.).See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORGANIZATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 26-29 (1955).
Y.B., 2 Hen. V, vol. 5, pl. 26 (1415), reprinted in MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE
REGULATION 33 (3d ed. 1990).
24 Y.B., I I Hen. IV, vol. 47, p1. 21 (1410), reprinted in MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE
REGULATION 34 (3d ed. 1990).
24 Eng. Rep. 347 (B.R. 1711).
26 Id. at 349.
2" Id. at 350, 352 (holding that, under certain circumstances, private contract in restraint of
trade may be reasonable and beneficial to society).
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The judges' suspicions of private restraints and public mo-
nopoly traveled to the New World together with philosophical
precepts they in part reflected. As a result, the colonial legisla-
ture of Massachusetts outlawed monopolies except those legiti-
mately granted for significant invention.28 The Virginia Bill of
Rights provided "[tlhat no man, or set of men, is entitled to ex-
clusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the commu-
nity ... ... Jefferson sought a similar provision for the federal
Bill of Rights, but despite wide support, no such language was
included.0
It was not until after the Civil War, however, that momen-
tum began to build in the direction of a search for more effective
tools to limit the abuse of monopoly and control restraints of
trade."' Americans had seemed always to take it for granted that
economic and political power would be diffused in a society that
remained hospitable to farmers and small tradesmen. But as
the small-enterprise economy yielded steadily and irresistibly to
an economic life perceived to be dominated by big business and
the accompanying threat of monopoly, the demand for legislative
action intensified.32 Anti-monopoly laws were championed by the
Grangers and other reformers concerned about unregulated pri-
vate economic power, particularly of the railroads, banks and the
so-called trusts.
But again the objection was as much political as economic:
trusts threatened liberty; they corrupted public officials; they de-
stroyed competitors; and they injured consumers by raising
prices. The public's mandate was very clear. What were called
antitrust laws came into existence first at the state level.33 And,
See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 59 (1965). "[T]he co-
lonial legislature of Massachusetts decreed that 'there shall be no monopolies granted or al-
lowed among us but of such new inventions as are profitable to the country, and that for a short
time."' Id. (citing Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay
170 (1814)).
VA. CONST., Bill of Rights, art. I, § 4 (1776).
30 LETWIN, supra note 28, at 59-60. Several states sought such a provision in the federal
Bill of Rights by including proposed amendments with their acts of ratification of the Constitu-
tion. Id.
31 See THORELLI, supra note 22, at 55-163 (examining how Civil War caused changes in
economic and political climates leading to passage of Sherman Act).
32 Id. at 132-43 (establishing that, by end of 1880s, public demand for antitrust legislation
was too strong for politicians to ignore).
33 Id. at 155-57 ("Before the enactment of [the Sherman Act], at least 14 states and territo-
ries had incorporated prohibitions against monopolies, trusts and similar devices to fix prices or
otherwise to restrict competition in their constitutions, and at least 13 [states] had statutory pro-
[Vol. 70:189
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even Congress was forced to heed the demands of the voters.
The alternative was, as Senator Sherman of Ohio put it, that the
nation would have to "be ready for the socialist, the communist,
and the nihilist. Society is now disturbed by forces never felt be-
fore."34 In a very real sense, then, the agitation for the enact-
ment of antitrust laws was a reaction against the oil, whiskey
and sugar trusts not only on economic grounds, but also on fun-
damental political grounds reflecting the long-standing Ameri-
can hostility toward unchecked concentrations of power, eco-
nomic or otherwise.
Although economists in general opposed any efforts to
prohibit trusts, regarding them as efficient and therefore desir-
able, the political parties turned up the volume of criticism.
With platforms of both parties condemning monopolists,35 the
newly elected President Harrison and a Congress controlled by
his fellow Republicans began work in earnest on antitrust legis-
lation in 1889.
Calling his proposal a "bill of rights" and a "charter of lib-
erty," Senator Sherman continually invoked the political anal-
ogy:
If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of
any of the necessaries of life. If we would not submit to an em-
peror we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power
to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.... 36
In the end, after vigorous debate, conflicting drafts, com-
mittee rivalries and great political pressure, the antitrust bill we
have since come to know as the Sherman Act,37 although it was
attributed to him only as a matter of courtesy,38 was passed by
the Senate with only one vote in opposition.39 The House passed
the bill with one amendment about a month later4 and it was
hibitions.").
21 Cong. Rec. 2455, 2460 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman), reprinted in IRVING J.
SLOAN, 3 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION 75(1976).
See LEmvIN, supra note 28, at 85-87 (explaining that both Democrats and Republicans
pandered to public's negative opinion of monopolies hoping to place their respective candidates
in presidency).SLOAN, supra note 34, at 69.
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1996).
LETWIN, supra note 28, at 94.
3' Id. at 95.
4 See id. at 95.
1996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
signed into law on July 2, 1890.41
In search of the objectives of antitrust, what are we to
make of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, other than
that it is complicated, internally inconsistent, highly political
and subject to a variety of interpretations? There is no doubt
that the legislation built upon the concepts of Adam Smith's in-
visible hand of the market and its complementary common law
suspicion of monopoly. But beyond that, some have argued that,
taken as a whole, the Sherman Act bespeaks a focus on con-
sumer welfare to the exclusion of non-economic values. Others
have said that the political impulse behind the Sherman Act-
"dividing, diffusing, and checking power and preventing its ex-
ercise by a single interest or by a consolidated group of interests
at a single center"-took precedence over the economic argu-
ments in favor of the legislation.42 Neither view seems entirely
fair: diffusion of concentrated power, both economical and politi-
cal, through the invisible hand of competition was the objective.
The abuses of monopoly and anticompetitive conduct, very much
as specified in the common law, were the enemies on political as
much as on economic grounds.
As with many congressional debates, this one was neither
systematic nor particularly sophisticated. Classical economics,
such as it then was, played little role, and the concepts of alloca-
tive efficiency or distributive justice were never mentioned.
Such a state of affairs is hardly very satisfying to those
who have trumpeted efficiency considerations, reflected in the
concern for consumer welfare, as the exclusive purpose of the
Sherman Act. Nor does it much please those on the other side of
the argument who have contended that any concept of efficiency
is entirely absent from the legislative history, and that instead
Congress was concerned with economic justice or fairness. Both
of these positions seem out of step with historical fact, and seem
rather to have been constructed to support some latter-day
agenda of antitrust ideology.
With respect to the Sherman Act, the fairest analysis
seems to be that the debates, though mixed, did demonstrate
fundamental congressional concern about large agglomerations
of economic power and the potential harm they portended for
4 Id.
42 See Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT 27 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991).
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individual consumers. Calling this concern a matter of allocative
efficiency or distributive justice, or dispersion of political power
does not add much to the underlying reality-private economic
power was feared because it engenders economic and political
power of a type wholly inconsistent with, first, the entire Ameri-
can ideal of checks and balances, and with, second, the commit-
ment to the preservation of individual opportunity in the face of
large firms.
Later antitrust enactments seem even less to support the
view that antitrust was motivated exclusively by economic effi-
ciency considerations. The Clayton Act43 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act," enacted in 1914 with their statutory focus on
preserving the competitive process and on eliminating unfair
methods of competition, bespeak a clearer concern for the pro-
tection of small businesses. The Robinson-Patman Act,45 enacted
in 1936, and the Celler-Kefauver amendments46 to the anti-
merger provisions of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1950, exhibit
congressional policy aimed at the preservation of small business,
even at the cost of higher prices to consumers.
How then are these confusing and sometimes conflicting
objectives to be reconciled by enforcers and courts, not to speak
of businesspersons who seek to plan a lawful course of conduct?
There is no doubt that the economic precepts of preserving com-
petition in the interests of consumer welfare must be part of the
equation; indeed enforcement decisions and judicial opinions
alike have over the years consistently and clearly focused on
these considerations.
But the wider range of factors, in addition to consumer
welfare, including a nervousness about the excessive concentra-
tion of economic power that might lead to anti-democratic politi-
cal pressure, in turn raising the specter of more intrusive state
regulation or control, simply cannot be ignored. To do so would
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1996).
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1996).
45 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936).
46 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950).
47 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251
(1993) (stating that Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Robinson-Patman Act all serve purpose of
protecting competition). "[T]he Robinson-Patman Act is concerned with consumer welfare and
competition." Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) (stating that Sherman Act aims at competition that pro-
motes consumer interest).
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mean turning away from what was historically, and politically,
one of the central motivating factors behind the enactment of the
Sherman Act initially, and just as important, behind the enor-
mous public acceptance of those laws over the last one hundred
years.
We begin by recognizing that the conflict between the eco-
nomic and the political objectives of antitrust policy is less seri-
ous in practice than in the abstract. I never heard anyone argue
in the halls of the Justice Department that admittedly efficient
conduct ought to be prosecuted because of a concern for small
business. Certainly no court in the last twenty-five years has
even suggested such a thing. Nor, usually, is there any need.
After all, prevention of the accumulation of monopoly power con-
tributes to consumer welfare by preventing price-gouging; at the
same time it meets the socio-political objective of dispersing eco-
nomic power.
What of those rarer instances when conflicts between the
social goals of antitrust policy and its economic objectives occur?
During the Great Depression, for example, the Supreme Court
allowed some coal producers to eliminate competition among
themselves to provide relief to a depressed industry,48 a social
objective with no immediately discernible relationship to eco-
nomic efficiency.
When social and economic goals conflict, the economic goal
must be presumed to have primacy. This emphasis is faithful to
Adam Smith's notion that the "invisible hand" of competition
should guide the operation of the economy. We believe that
competition is, after all, the best means of eliminating excess
profits; of allocating resources to their most efficient use; of
forcing firms to produce goods of the highest quality at the low-
est cost, in amounts consumers want; and of stimulating inno-
vation. All these add to consumer welfare and, at the same
time, effectively promote economic growth and prosperity, which
is the definition of success for an economy. We also observe
that, to the extent that other objectives need to be served, such
48 See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 361 (1933) (discussing state
of economic conditions of coal industry). The Court stated that although "[t]he unfortunate state
of the industry would not justify any attempt unduly to restrain competition or to monopolize,
... the existing situation prompted [Appalachian Coals] to make ... an honest effort to remove
abuses, to make competition fairer, and thus to promote the essential interests of commerce." Id.
at 372.
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as small business protection, there are laws other than the anti-
trust laws that serve these functions more efficiently and more
precisely.
49
But establishing the primacy of economic efficiency as the
goal of antitrust policy is often the beginning, not the end, of
analysis. The problem of selecting the path to an efficient out-
come remains. Should we forego the short-term advantages of a
possibly lethal price cut, announced by a dominant firm, in favor
of the longer-run efficiencies that flow from maintaining multi-
firm rivalry? In short, must we on occasion protect competitors
to preserve competition? Such protection may at times be noth-
ing more than the costly coddling of the inefficient, and at other
times a step necessary to maintain competition in the long-run.
Because economists cannot always provide clear guidance, and
because political and social considerations cannot with intel-
lectual honesty be ignored, especially in the face of such uncer-
tainty, enforcers and courts face a sometimes difficult chore. But
those cases, experience teaches, are rare. More often, the effi-
cient solution is clear, and not at war with society's non-
economic objectives.
There is one sector of the economy that deserves greater
emphasis of the non-economic objectives of the antitrust laws-
the media. At the outset, let me make two points very clearly.
First, I raise this issue only as a theoretical matter-it seems to
me that the media industry in this country is at the moment
healthy, sufficiently diverse and unconcentrated, so that no ac-
tual issue of undue media concentration exists. Second, I am not
arguing for a whole separate set of competition rules that apply
to the media alone, nor am I suggesting that the First Amend-
ment renders all of the traditional rules of anti-merger enforce-
ment and other competition rules irrelevant.
I am saying instead that with respect to structure and
conduct in the media industry, the price of a mistake in protect-
ing competition could be quite high. Our democracy requires a
wide diversity of voices in the national conversation on public
49 See, e.g., Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1976 & Supp. 1992) ("It is the declared
policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect ... the inter-
ests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise .... "); Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945, 12 U.S.C. § 635(g)(b) (1989 & Supp. 1996) ("The report shall contain
a description of actions taken by the Bank in pursuance of the policy of aiding, counseling, as-
sisting, and protecting ... the interests of small business concerns .... ").
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policy issues. In general, I believe that objective is now well
satisfied, despite A.J. Liebling's aphorism that in this country
freedom of the press is reserved to those who own one.0 But the
fact is that in a democracy such as ours, the competition of ideas
is even more important than competition in markets. The First
Amendment and the Areopagitica51 intersect with the Sherman
Act. Together they raise crucial and sensitive issues, particu-
larly now as huge mergers in this industry are being proposed
and consummated.
Imagine, for instance, a media merger that under Merger
Guidelines" standards is on the borderline of moderate concen-
tration in a relevant market. Enforcement might not be clearly
called for on pure efficiency grounds. But non-enforcement
might be one more step toward the disappearance of an impor-
tant voice in the marketplace of ideas. In this circumstance of
ambiguity and doubt, without much support from the economic
objectives of the antitrust laws but motivated solely by the non-
economic objectives, I would argue for enforcement. Fortunately,
in a country that in recent years has welcomed an entirely new
television network, where cable television is putting traditional
broadcast television under enormous pressure, and where the in-
formation highway traffic is providing competitive alternatives
the potential of which is only beginning to be realized, the prob-
lem I describe seems highly theoretical. But with the recent
merger activity in the media and communications industry, the
framework of analysis is worth examination.
More generally, then, we enter the second hundred years
of antitrust, relying on a body of law with both economic and po-
litical content. Both are still relevant today to the law's imple-
mentation by enforcers and courts alike. Both are also still rele-
vant today to the public support for those laws, without which
they will be ineffective. Too much emphasis on the economic as-
pects will undermine the broad coalition of political support; too
little emphasis and markets will suffer, business will complain
and consumers will be injured.
To one attempting to think about the future role of anti-
50 A.J. LIEBLING, THE WAYWARD PRESSMAN 265 (1947).
51 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in AREOPAGITICA (Edward Arber ed.,
1869).
52 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, THE 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: COMMENTARY
AND TEXT (1992).
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trust, it is instructive to observe the antitrust laws now in op-
eration in other countries. After World War II, the Allied occu-
pation authorities in Germany and Japan surely acted from both
economic and political motives when they imposed anti-cartel
laws on the defeated Axis powers. It was widely believed that
the German industrial combines that had supported National
Socialism so enthusiastically would never have existed in that
powerful form had some kind of antitrust laws been in place.
And so they were put in place, so that it could never happen
again. Today Germany's law is vigorously enforced in some ar-
eas, particularly mergers, less so in others, particularly with re-
spect to cooperative associations. Japan's law reads well, but is
only now beginning to realize its potential.
The point is that in both countries the laws were intended
to, and do still, play a mixed economic and political role. Now,
some fifty years later, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
empire, and the socialist ideal, antitrust laws have been enacted
in country after country, in both the developed and developing
world. 3 And the European Union has a highly developed body of
antitrust rules in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome,'
elaborated in forty years of case law. Collectively, these laws are
debated, enforced, amended, and sometimes obeyed. Much of the
inspiration for the entire enterprise comes from the experience of
the United States.
It is surprising, therefore, that from time to time here in
the United States it is deemed fashionable to deprecate the com-
petitive system, to criticize the antitrust laws as old-fashioned,
and to look to other models of industrial organization as more
appropriate in the "post-industrial" world of global competition.
This is really nothing new.
America suffered through the Great Depression in the
1930s and was told that the Soviet model of centralized direction
of economic affairs should be adopted. Later, after the Second
World War, other critics looked to the socialist societies of Brit-
See Roger W. Mastalir, Regulation of Competition in the "New" Free Markets of Eastern
Europe: A Comparative Study of Antitrust Laws in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Slo-
vak Republic, and their Models, 19 N.C. . INT'L L. & COM. REG. 61, 61 (1993) ("Soon after the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the countries of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslo-
vakia enacted laws protecting competition to facilitate the transition to market economies and to
ensure the health and stability of those markets in the future.").
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85 & 86, 1
Treaties Establishing the European Communities 207 (1987 ed.).
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ain and Sweden for guides to superior economic performance, or
to the dirigisme of France's planned economy.55
Now we are told that in the new age of global competition,
in which technology and information will produce new kinds of
competition, traditional concepts of antitrust will be outmoded.
For example, it is said that in industries dominated by tech-
nologies requiring huge capital investment and mammoth re-
search capabilities, traditional market share analysis will some-
how fall short, because only a handful of the largest firms will be
able to survive, a concept, so the argument goes, that antitrust
cannot coherently contemplate. 6
There really seems less to these critiques than meets the
eye. For a hundred years, through all kinds of economic phases,
antitrust policy in this country has remained remarkably consis-
tent in condemning the most clearly offensive forms of collusion
and monopolization. Admittedly there have occasionally been
broad swings: enforcement was probably somewhat over-
aggressive, with resulting over-deterrence in the 1950s and
1960s; it was probably too passive, with damaging effects on
competition, throughout most of the 1930s and during portions of
the 1980s.
Nevertheless, throughout it all, America's economy ground
on, producing enormous wealth and distributing it widely, as
firms vied with each other to keep costs and prices down, and to
discover new products that might appeal to consumers. Some
industries managed to avoid tough competition, at least for a
time, without necessarily violating the law. The automobile in-
dustry and the steel industry in this country became so beguiled
by their market shares that they grew inattentive to costs and to
the need to innovate. The antitrust laws probably did not reach
"" See generally David J. Gerber, Law and the Abuse of Economic Power in Europe, 62 Tul.
L. Rev. 57, 64-66 (1995) (contrasting European competition laws formed during post World
War II period with United States' antitrust laws).
56 See Neil W. Hamilton & Anne M. Caufield, The Defense of Natural Monopoly in Sher-
man Act Monopolization, 33 DEPAUL L. REv. 465, 485 (1984) (noting that application of tradi-
tional market share analysis to demonstrate monopoly power may lead to incorrect conclusions);
George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 813-14 (1992) (stating that
in cases of successful product differentiation firms will have low market shares and thus be safe
from antitrust regulation under traditional market share analysis); Lawrence J. Hilton, Antitrust
and Foreign Competition: Proposals for a Dynamic Approach to Market Power Analysis, 26
TEX. INT'L L.J. 315, 316 (1991) (arguing that traditional market share analysis based on present
market shares creates anomaly in antitrust context where most antitrust analyses attempt to pre-
dict economic effect of future transactions).
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these quiet oligopolies, and as a result these failures and their
anticompetitive effects were costlier and more prolonged than
might have been necessary. But new entry eventually arrived.
Foreign firms entered our markets-and consumers were offered
alternatives that the sleepier domestic firms had not bothered to
explore.
Significantly, America's smaller, more competitive com-
panies continued to thrive, and to provide the energy for an
enormous growth in jobs. Their ability to enter markets and
compete with established firms is guaranteed by the antitrust
laws. Once established, many new entrants undoubtedly would
have preferred the easier life of the cartelist, but the antitrust
laws deprived them of the opportunity to fix prices or merge
their way to market dominance.
And what benefits to the economy antitrust has brought.
As an example, the case against AT&T57 probably liberated more
entrepreneurial energy than any other antitrust case ever filed,
and even it was roundly criticized by those hostile to antitrust
enforcement." But the record shows that, since the case was
settled, long-distance prices for residential customers have de-
clined sixty-six percent, in real terms;"9 minutes of use have in-
creased dramatically;" and there are now literally hundreds of
long distance carriers from which to choose.6' And Americans
are choosing. In fact, in 1994 more than 25 million customers
changed long distance carriers at least once.62
' United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affid sub nom., Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
68 See Basil L. Copeland, Jr. & Alan Severn, Price Theory and Telecommunications Regu-
lation: A Dissenting View, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 58 (1985) (stating that although divestiture of
AT&T has been heralded as opportunity to eliminate cross-subsidization static price, theory fails
to prove that traditional pricing of telecommunications services distorts allocation of resources);
Paul W. McAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning By Losing: The AT&T Settlement and its Im-
pact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30 (1983) (criticizing AT&T divestiture for
conveying some natural monopoly advantages on AT&T and arguing that current competition
exists only because of regulatory "umbrella" keeping rates up); Irwin M. Stelzer & Richard
Schmalensee, Potential Costs and Benefits of Vertical Integration, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 252
(1983) (stating that whatever beneficial effects on competition disintegration of AT&T may
have, transaction costs in related areas may well go up).
59 Anne K. Bingaman, Antitrust Policy for the Twenty-First Century, 48 SMU L. REV.
1669, 1671 (1995) (citing Robert E. Hall, Long Distance: Public Benefits From Increased Com-
petition Oct. 1993, at i).
c' Id. (citing ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
A MORE COMPETITIVE ERA 44 (1991)).
61 Id. (citing Hall, supra note 59, at 18).
Id. (citing Edmund L. Andrews, No-Holds-Barred Battle for Long-Distance Calls, N.Y.
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So the results of relying on competition as a central organ-
izing principle of the economy, and on antitrust as competition's
guarantor, speak for themselves both in economic and political
terms. The key, of course, is always to adapt the antitrust laws
to new circumstances, still remaining true to their fundamental
pro-competition and anti-monopoly principles. 3
This is done in a variety of ways. Within the broad statu-
tory language, courts are free to vary interpretation as economic
learning and competitive circumstances evolve. Legislative
amendments to the statutes themselves, for instance clarifying
the permissible scope of joint ventures for research and devel-
opment, or in overseas markets," do help. Guidelines like those
relating to specific industries such as health care, or dealing
with lawful conduct for firms producing and using intellectual
property, can be promulgated. Together, they are all part of a
continuing process of evolution and modernizing. But the basic
ban on collusive activities and monopolizing behavior remains.
As economic activity becomes more complex, and the arena
within which it takes place becomes truly global, further adap-
tation will undoubtedly take place. But two points are critical.
First, domestic markets must always be kept competitive under
pressure from antitrust enforcement. Second, where markets
are truly international, antitrust analysis must see those facts
clearly and realistically: the true dimensions of the competitive
problem must be understood and enforcement must take place
only in a way that deals with that reality.
Let me say a further word about each of those points.
When our firms go forth from our shores to compete in new eco-
nomic markets that are half a world away, they must do so in
the most efficient and innovative ways possible. The critical task
of the antitrust laws in this circumstance is to enforce competi-
tive rivalry in domestic markets to ensure that American firms
are efficient and .effective abroad.
The fact is that firms that are not subject to the rigors of
competition at home have little chance of success abroad. Too
easily they succumb to the quiet life of the cartelist, where with-
out the goad of competition they are never forced to upgrade
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1995, at 1).
63 In passing the Sherman Act "Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to
protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent." MILTON HANDLER ET AL., supra note 23, at
8. 15 U.S.C. § 4306 (Supp. 1995).
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their performance, or to innovate or to seek more efficient solu-
tions. Consequently, in this country at least, any strategy of cre-
ating national champions should be out of the question. There
seems likewise little room in an economy as vibrant as ours for
suspending competition in order to protect infant industries or to
provide breathing space for firms forced to adjust to avoid indus-
try decline.
To focus this general point further, we need to continue to
restore the competitiveness of those markets that have over the
years been unnecessarily subjected to economic regulation. The
reason is so that, quite apart from the obvious consumer bene-
fits, firms in those markets can develop their competitive edge
for trial in new markets, even abroad. After a spate of legisla-
tive activity in the late 1970s and very early 1980s,65 the political
pressure for deregulation seems to have lost its steam. While
the United States in comparison with other countries is re-
markably unregulated, there are still too many sectors of eco-
nomic activity where the full play of the forces of competition is
unnecessarily muted or altogether suppressed. We need once
again to take up the unfinished agenda of economic deregulation.
Not only will that redound to the benefit of American consumers,
but it will also provide the needed competitive discipline for
American firms that wish to position themselves to compete
abroad.
Thus, in our domestic markets the work of antitrust is
more important than ever. It is no less so in complex high-
technology international markets. In those markets, antitrust
analysis must, of course, rise to the task of accurately assessing
what is going on, of evaluating complex transactions in a global
context. But there is really nothing novel in that. If the geo-
graphic market within which to assess competitive effect is
multi-national, so be it. If tariffs play a greater or lesser role in
the movement of goods within markets across international
boundaries, those effects can be calibrated and assessed. If intel-
lectual property laws vary in their effectiveness from country to
country, then the reasonableness of conduct designed to protect
See, e.g., Business Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102
(codified in various sections of 15, 26, 39, & 49 U.S.C.); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified in various sections of 18 & 49 U.S.C.); Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified as
amended in various sections of 15, 31, 45, & 49 U.S.C.).
1996] 205
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
such property needs to be analyzed in a highly nuanced way.
The point is that new industries with great demands on capital
resources producing sophisticated technological products do not
repeal the laws of competition, nor do they make antitrust ir-
relevant. In these markets, calls for the burying of antitrust
must be rejected.
Once again, therefore, America's pro-competition policies
will survive, despite the occasional critics from academia or the
corporate board room or the halls of Congress, and despite the
apparent attractiveness of other models. Japan's highly car-
telized economy seemed for a time so successful that our contin-
ued reliance on competition was called into question.66 But, even
before the Japanese economy lapsed into severe recession, it be-
came obvious that Japan's cartels keep prices to consumers at
levels that can only be described as extortionate,67 and depress
living standards to an extent that would be unacceptable in this
country and soon will be unacceptable even there. Meanwhile,
the German model of interrelated financial and industrial firms,
working in close partnership with government, lost its tempo-
rary appeal when it became apparent that many once-efficient
German firms had failed to innovate sufficiently to keep pace
with international rivals, and that German industry is now so
burdened with social costs as to be uncompetitive in many mar-
kets. For these and other reasons, the Japanese and German
models, like the centrally directed economies of an earlier era,
hardly seem credible alternatives to a competitive economy such
as ours.
American industry certainly faces many problems. But an
excess of competition should not be included in the roster of vil-
lains. Small competitive firms continue to grow and prosper;
large industrial behemoths that rest on the laurels of historical
market share continue to shrivel. Firms that must be lean and
mean to meet domestic competition are and will remain Amer-
ica's best representatives in an international arena. In short,
the antitrust laws' preservation of competition has been an es-
66 See David L. Glotzer, Reading Between the Lines: High Definition Television, Antitrust
Reform and America 's Chance to Get Back Into the Television Business, 10 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 127, 151 (1991) (stating that Japan's success in high technology industries during
American recession of 1970s made deficiencies in existing antitrust policies obvious).
67 See generally Alex Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of Japan 's Anti-
monopoly Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 115 (noting that Japanese businesses formed cartels to
limit supply and keep prices inflated).
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sential ingredient in the development of a technologically ad-
vanced, high-income, consumer-driven economy that remains to-
day the envy of the world, as it will for the next hundred years,
at least.

